

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1994
INFO CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 2144

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, AF
SUBJECT: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: A) STATE 38356, B) STATE 38338, C) STATE 49794,
D) CERP 0001, E) STATE 47671, F) STATE 15063

A. U.S. INTERESTS

AFGHANISTAN'S PRIMARY IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES DERIVES FROM ITS LOCATION AND OUR BROADER INTERESTS TOWARD EACH OF THE THREE NATIONS - THE SOVIET UNION, IRAN, AND PAKISTA - WITH WHICH THE COUNTRY SHARES COMMON BORDERS. WE HAVE NO VITAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, OR MILITARY INTERESTS WITHIN AFGHANISTAN ITSELF. OUR PRIMARY INTERESTS ARE (1) TO FOSTER AN INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN WILLING AND ABLE TO IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET INFLUENCE; AND (2) TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSER AFGHAN REGIONAL TIES AND HENCE REGIONAL STABILITY THROUGH THE IMPROVEMENT OF AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN. SO LONG AS AFGHANISTAN REMAINS STABLE, INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED, THESE POLICY INTERESTS ARE WELL SERVED. ALTHOUGH OUR INTEREST IS TO
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AVOID EXCESSIVE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, WE ALSO DO NOT WISH TO HAVE AFGHANISTAN BECOME A SERIOUS FRICTION POINT IN SOVIET/AMERICAN RELATIONS. OUR COURSE IS TO PURSUE OUR INTERESTS WITHOUT RAISING THE POLITICAL PROFILE OF AFGHANISTAN ON THE WORLD SCENE. THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO SHARE THIS INTEREST.

A MAJOR U.S. INTEREST DERIVES FROM THE FACT THAT AFGHANISTAN

IS ONE OF THE LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR GLOBAL POLICIES ON NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS AND ON ASSISTANCE TO THE POOREST COUNTRIES, WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN AIDING AFGHAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.

OUR BILATERAL INTERESTS ARE: (1) TO SEE AFGHANISTAN BEHAVE IN A TRULY "NON-ALIGNED" MANNER IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS; (2) TO PREVENT AFGHAN OPIUM AND ITS DERIVATIVES FROM REACHING THE U.S.; AND (3) TO INCREASE THE COMMERCIAL EXPORT OF U.S. GOODS AND SERVICES TO AFGHANISTAN.

B. OVERVIEW

THE RECENT PROMULGATION OF A CONSTITUTION AND THE ELECTION OF MOHAMMAD DAOUD AS PRESIDENT GIVE A SEAL OF LEGITIMACY TO HIS LEADERSHIP AND INSTITUTIONALIZE THE REPUBLIC HE DECLARED ALMOST FOUR YEARS AGO. BARRING THE DEATH OR INCAPACITATION OF DAOUD, I SEE LITTLE POSSIBILITY THAT THE STABILITY OF HIS REGIME WILL BE SERIOUSLY CHALLENGED IN THE NEXT TWO TO FIVE YEARS. OUR RELATIONS WITH THE POLICY LEVEL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (GOA) ARE EXCELLENT AND THE IMPROVING CLIMATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP HAS CONTRIBUTED TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES OF EACH OTHER'S INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES.

DAOUD IS A NATIONALIST, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE. HE WILL MAINTAIN AFGHANISTAN'S NON-ALIGNMENT, WHICH GENERALLY ACCORDS WITH OUR INTERESTS. THERE ARE NO OUTSTANDING U.S./SOVIET ISSUES THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE PRESENT SITUATION; AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN SHOW MODEST IMPROVEMENT; AND THE PERENNIAL

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DISPUTE WITH IRAN OVER THE ALLOCATION OF HELMAND RIVER WATERS, THOUGH STILL A PROBLEM, MAY BE ON THE ROAD TO RESOLUTION. I WOULD NOT EXPECT TO SEE THE U.S./SOVIET BALANCE IN THIS COUNTRY CHANGE, AT LEAST WHILE DAOUD IS IN POWER, AND I ANTICIPATE, ALTHOUGH WITH LESS CONFIDENCE, THAT RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN WILL EITHER IMPROVE OR REMAIN ON AN EVEN KEEL.

WE STILL HAVE SOME BILATERAL PROBLEMS. I AM NOT ENTIRELY HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS OF OUR DIALOGUE OVER MULTILATERAL ISSUES AND THE AFGHAN VOTING RECORD IN THE UN; THE AFGHANS ARE PROCRASTINATING OVER SETTLEMENT OF A U.S. COMMERCIAL CLAIM THAT COULD HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE WILLINGNESS OF OTHER U.S. FIRMS TO DO BUSINESS HERE; WE HAVE HAD PROBLEMS IN AGREEING ON SELECTION OF PERSONS FOR OUR EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS; THE CONTINUING CULTIVATION OF OPIUM POPPIES IN AFGHANISTAN COULD BECOME A SERIOUS BILATERAL ISSUE; A DISPUTE OVER APPROPRIATENESS OF PREVIOUSLY AGREED UPON U.S. ASSISTANCE PROJECTS COULD UNDERMINE OUR CREDIBILITY.

CONSIDERING THAT AFGHANISTAN RANKS AS ONE OF THE WORLD'S LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE COUNTRY IS FAIRLY STRONG. HOWEVER, DROUGHT OR OTHER NATURAL DISASTER ADVERSELY AFFECTING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION COULD QUICKLY ERODE THAT POSITION. LIKEWISE, THE COUNTRY HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE MORE THAN A MODEST RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, ALTHOUGH THE DAOUD GOVERNMENT IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

OUR AID, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, USIS AND PEACE CORPS PROGRAMS DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHERING U.S. INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

C. U.S. OBJECTIVES

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN AND COMMENT CONCERNING THESE OBJECTIVES FOLLOW: (OBJECTIVES ARE NOT LISTED BY PRIORITY)

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1. TO FOSTER AN INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, WILLING AND ABLE TO IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET INFLUENCE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1995
INFO CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 2144

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COMMENT: THE ENTIRE U.S. PRESENCE HERE SERVES THIS OBJECTIVE. IT IS

MY VIEW THAT OUR LEVEL OF ACTIVITY IN AFGHANISTAN IS ADEQUATE TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE, ALTHOUGH OUR MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAMS AND CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS SHOULD BE EXPANDED IF CONDITIONS WARRANT. THESE ARE RELATIVELY LOW COST BUT EFFECTIVE MEANS OF INFLUENCING KEY AFGHAN OFFICIALS.

2. TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSER AFGHAN REGIONAL TIES THROUGH THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN.

COMMENT: WE SHOULD DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR APPROACHES TO ISLAMABAD AND TEHRAN ON AFGHAN MATTERS. FOR EXAMPLE, I FORESEE THAT THE SHAH AND HIS GOVERNMENT CAN PLAY A CONTINUING CREATIVE ROLE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE AFGHANS. IN ISLAMABAD, ON THE OTHER HAND, A POSTURE OF SYMPATHETIC CONCERN FOR GOOD REGIONAL RELATIONS, BUT NO PRESSURE ON THE PAKS TO ACT IN A PARTICULAR WAY TOWARD THE AFGHANS WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE FOR U.S. INTERESTS.

3. TO ASSIST AFGHANISTAN IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY.
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COMMENT: I FORESEE AS NECESSARY A CONTINUED BILATERAL AID PROGRAM IN THIS COUNTRY, TO MAINTAIN OUR PRESENCE AS WELL AS TO ASSIST IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THE HISTORIC AVERAGE OF APPROXIMATELY \$20 MILLION IN U.S. ASSISTANCE ANNUALLY PROBABLY IS APPROPRIATE FOR AFGHANISTAN FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

THE MAJORITY OF OUR AID PROJECTS IN AFGHANISTAN DIRECTLY BENEFIT THE RURAL POOR (RURAL SCHOOLS, HEALTH CENTERS, SMALL-SCALE INFRASTRUCTURE AND IRRIGATION PROJECTS); A FEW OTHERS ADDRESS AFGHAN WEAKNESSES IN MANPOWER AND TECHNICAL SKILLS IN AREAS RELATED TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT. IT IS IN THIS AREA WHERE A PROBLEM LOOMS. A U.S. COMMITMENT TO HELP KABUL UNIVERSITY EXPAND ITS ENGINEERING FACULTY IS BEING HEDGED BY WASHINGTON TO WHAT IS IN MY VIEW AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE. PURSUING THIS COURSE COULD DAMAGE OUR CREDIBILITY AND HENCE U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS.

4. TO FOSTER A BROADER COMMUNITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING AFGHAN APPRECIATION OF THE RELEVANCE OF AMERICAN VALUES TO THEIR NATIONAL PROBLEMS.

COMMENT: OUR CULTURAL EXCHANGE AND MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS ARE THE PRIMARY MEANS OF ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE. THESE PROGRAMS SHOULD BE EXPANDED IF CONDITIONS WARRANT. HOWEVER, WE HAVE HAD PROBLEMS IN THE SELECTION OF SUITABLE CANDIDATES AND WE MUST BE WILLING TO CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SELECTION BE MAINTAINED FOR THE PROGRAMS.

5. TO ENCOURAGE AN INCREASE IN AFGHAN UTILIZATION OF AMERICAN PRODUCTS AND SERVICES IN UNDERTAKINGS FINANCED BY OPEC COUNTRIES AND OTHER DONORS AND TO ENCOURAGE U.S./AFGHAN INVESTMENT PROJECTS.

COMMENT: THE PROBLEM OF DOING BUSINESS IN AFGHANISTAN ARE LEGION AND DISCOURAGE MANY AMERICAN FIRMS FROM ATTEMPTING TO SECURE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS OR INVEST HERE. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES, AND WE PLAN TO CONTINUE OUR COMMERCIAL EFFORTS TO SEE
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AMERICAN BUSINESS PARTICIPATE HERE.

6. TO OBTAIN MORE FAVORABLE AFGHAN VOTES ON MULTILATERAL FORUMS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT BY THE UNITED STATES.

COMMENT: WE HAVE HAD MIXED RESULTS IN PURSUING THIS OBJECTIVE. WE PLAN TO CONTINUE TO BRING OUR VIEWS FORCEFULLY TO THE GOA'S ATTENTION.

7. TO SUPPORESS AFGHAN HEROIN PROCESSING POTENTIAL, DISRUPT TRAFFICKING NETWORKS, AND ENCOURAGE THE ERADICATION OF OPIUM CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN.

COMMENT: IF THE GOA AGREES TO AN EFFECTIVE BILATERAL EFFORT, U.S. NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAMS WILL SEE SOME EXPANSION OF U.S. RESOURCES IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE GOA HAS INDICATED THEORETICAL WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE MORE DIRECTLY WITH THE U.S. IN THIS EFFORT AND WE HOPE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THEM IN THEIR EFFORTS TO GET THIS PROBLEM UNDER BETTER CONTROL. WE PLAN TO CHANNEL THE BULK OF INCREASED U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR NARCOTICS CONTROL THROUGH UNFDAC TO AFGHANISTAN.
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